What Explains the Increased Utilization of Powder River Basin Coal in Electric Power Generation? by Gerking, Shelby & Hamilton, Stephen F.
WHAT EXPLAINS THE INCREASED UTILIZATION
 
OF POWDER RIVER BASIN COAL IN ELECTRIC
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SHELBY GERKING AND STEPHEN F. HAMILTON 
This article examines possible explanations for increased utilization of Powder River Basin (PRB) coal 
in electric power generation that occurred over the last two decades. Did more stringent environmental 
policy motivate electric power plants to switch to less polluting fuels? Or, did greater use of PRB coal 
occur because relative price changes altered input markets in favor of this fuel. A key ﬁnding is 
that factors other than environmental policy such as the decline in railroad freight rates together 
with elastic demand by power plants were major contributors to the increased utilization of this 
fuel. 
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Since the inception of the Clean Air Act in 
1970, SO2 emissions in the United States de­
clined by 50% at less than 10% of the originally 
estimated cost (Kerr 1998). Much of this re­
duction appears to have occurred through sub­
stitution at electric utilities from high-sulfur 
coal to cleaner-burning inputs of low-sulfur 
coal from the Powder River Basin (PRB) of 
Wyoming and Montana. Over the twelve-year 
period 1990–2002, PRB coal production more 
than doubled and the number of utilities burn­
ing this fuel more than tripled, while coal pro­
duction in the high-sulfur Illinois Basin (Illi­
nois, Indiana, and West Kentucky) declined 
by 42%. Identifying the relative importance of 
factors that can explain these stylized facts is 
essential to understanding the role of environ­
mental policy to control SO2 emissions. 
This article weighs several possible expla­
nations for the dramatic increase in utiliza-
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tion of low-sulfur PRB coal to generate elec­
tric power. One explanation for increased PRB 
coal use, emphasized by the U.S. Department 
of Energy (2000), is that more stringent envi­
ronmental policy motivated electric utilities to 
switch to less polluting fuels. The Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 lowered SO2 emissions 
limits for the dirtiest power plants and allowed 
for expanded compliance options through the 
landmark introduction of marketable emis­
sions permits. An alternative explanation is 
that greater use of PRB coal may have oc­
curred because of relative price changes that 
were unrelated to innovations in environmen­
tal policy. The period 1985–2000 witnessed sub­
stantial declines in the mine-mouth price of 
PRB coal, railroad freight rates, and rail trans­
portation costs. These factors potentially in­
duced existing buyers to increase their use of 
this fuel and attracted new buyers through an 
expansion of railroad service territories. 
The analysis is framed around a model of 
railroad behavior for two reasons.1 First, trans­
portation is a signiﬁcant source of value-added 
in the market for delivered, low-sulfur coal. 
PRB coal is shipped almost entirely by rail 
and transportation costs run as high as 80% 
of delivered prices. Second, the small num­
ber of railroads that deliver PRB coal suggests 
1 Numerous recent studies (see, e.g., Joskow, Schmalensee, and 
Bailey 1998; Montero 1999; and Carlson et al. 2000) have exam­
ined performance of federal environmental policy by looking at 
the market for emission permits. For a detailed discussion of the 
political economy of allocating emission permits, see Joskow and 
Schmalensee (1998). 
a potential for market power that can com­
promise the effectiveness of environmental 
policy.2 
It turns out that the extent of railroad market 
power is crucial to sorting out the importance 
of the various factors that led to increased uti­
lization of PRB coal. Consider, for instance, 
the effectiveness of SO2 emission controls in 
stimulating input substitution favoring low sul­
fur fuels at electric utilities. If the railroad 
sector is competitive, SO2 emission controls 
bid up delivered PRB coal prices, encourag­
ing deliveries of PRB coal to more distant 
utilities, while leaving deliveries to existing 
buyers unchanged. If the railroad sector is 
noncompetitive, SO2 policy similarly expands 
the geographic market for PRB coal; however, 
because demand facing railroads is more elas­
tic at greater shipping distances, the entry of 
new utilities in the service region alters the 
ability of railroads to spatially price discrim­
inate. Shipments to existing buyers, as a con­
sequence, are reduced. 
The model of railroad behavior is tested us­
ing unique data on 353 PRB coal shipment 
routes for the period 1988–1999. Two key ﬁnd­
ings emerge from the empirical analysis. First, 
the geographic market area for PRB coal ex­
panded largely because of declines in rail trans­
portation costs and the mine-mouth price of 
PRB coal, and to a lesser extent because of 
more stringent environmental policy including 
the introduction of SO2 emission permits. Sec­
ond, the demand for PRB coal is price elastic, 
so the decline in delivered prices that occurred 
over this period provided incentives for power 
plant operators to substitute toward the use of 
PRB coal throughout the railroad service ter­
ritory. Controlling for shipping distance, the 
empirical results show that electric generat­
ing plants with Table A units—the units sin­
gled out in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990 for immediate SO2 emission reduction— 
paid no higher freight rates and bought no 
more PRB coal than plants without Table A 
units. These results, differ from recent ﬁnd­
ings of Busse and Keohane (2007) who ﬁnd 
an important role for environmental policy in 
2 More generally, the analysis also contributes to the literature 
on market performance in the transportation sector and provides 
a rare glimpse into how market power is exercised over space. 
Market performance has been examined in the airline industry 
(see, e.g., Borenstein 1989, 1990; Brander and Zhang 1990; Kim 
and Singal 1993) and in the trucking industry (Savage 1995). The 
potential to exercise market power in rail transportation has been 
recognized since at least the case of Standard Oil (see Granitz and 
Klein 1996). 
shaping coal market outcomes, but nonethe­
less are broadly consistent with: (1) Ellerman 
and Montero (1998) and Ellerman et al. (2000) 
who found that environmental policy was not 
an important contributor to increased utiliza­
tion of PRB coal in electric power genera­
tion and (2) Greenstone (2002), who argues 
that environmental policy was not a major fac­
tor leading to the observed decline in SO2 
emissions. 
Background 
The model developed in the following section 
has three types of agents (mines, railroads, and 
electric utilities) and two types of markets (a 
market between mines and railroads and a se­
ries of spatially distributed markets between 
railroads and individual utilities). Key aspects 
of the model are: (1) mines are perfect com­
petitors, (2) railroads potentially exercise mar­
ket power in the determination of freight rates, 
and (3) utilities have no bargaining power. 
These aspects differ in several respects from 
the way industry structure has been conceived 
in earlier studies, and the purpose of this sec­
tion is to reconcile these views. 
In the 1980s, leading studies of the PRB 
coal market suggested at least four poten­
tially important sources of noncompetitive be­
havior among mines, railroads, and utilities. 
First, Atkinson and Kerkvliet (1986) argued 
that mines may have market power because of 
entry barriers that arise from restrictions on 
federal coal leasing, from the long lead times 
required to construct mines and to obtain oper­
ating permits, and from the large capital invest­
ments required to minimize average extraction 
cost. Second, mines in the PRB, both then and 
today, produce heterogeneous coal with im­
portant differences in BTU and in levels of im­
purities such as sulfur, sodium, and ash. Power 
engineers in the early 1980s widely believed 
that, because particular generating units only 
could accommodate coal with narrowly de­
ﬁned characteristics, the heterogeneity of PRB 
coal deposits limited substitution possibilities 
between suppliers. This provided an incentive 
for both mines and utilities to enter into long-
term contracts to protect relationship-speciﬁc 
investments (Joskow 1987). Third, railroads 
may have market power because few railroads 
serve PRB mines and alternative modes of coal 
transportation out of the PRB either are not 
cost-effective (e.g., trucking) or else do not 
exist (e.g., barges and coal slurry pipelines). 
Fourth, as Kolstad and Wolak (1983) observe, 
state governments may exert market power 
by competing strategically for resource rents 
through severance taxes on production. 
Since these early studies, new information 
has come to light to suggest that much has 
changed in the coal market. Barriers to entry 
eased substantially following the procoal deci­
sion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. 
Kleppe in 1976 and the end of the moratorium 
on federal coal leasing in the 1980s. Between 
1984 and 2002, the number of operating mines 
remained constant (twenty mines), while aver­
age annual production per mine grew from 6.1 
million tons to 18.75 million tons, which sug­
gests that mines today exploit economies of 
scale to a greater extent than they did in earlier 
years. Average production costs for PRB coal 
declined sharply over this period as a result 
of capital investment in excavation equipment 
such as conveyors, earth-moving vehicles, and 
draglines together with advances in computer­
ization and control equipment (Darmstadter 
1999). A production-weighted average of engi­
neering estimates of mine-speciﬁc real variable 
costs per ton declined by 57% between 1985 
and 2000 ($4.68/ton vs. $2.01/ton). Indeed, 
even in nominal terms, the average extraction 
costs for PRB coal declined by nearly 40% 
(BXG, Inc. 1985a; Hill and Associates, Inc. 
2000).3 Accordingly, the average real mine-
mouth price of PRB coal fell by 64% (from 
$13.97/ton vs. $5.38/ton) (U.S. Department of 
Energy, Energy Information Administration 
various years) over the period. 
The decline in coal production costs and 
mine-mouth prices in the PRB, mirrors a na­
tionwide trend in coal markets. For instance, 
in the Illinois Basin, an important high-sulfur 
coal region, a production-weighted average 
of engineering estimates of mine-speciﬁc real 
variable costs per ton fell by about the same 
percentage as in the PRB between 1985 and 
2002 (54%; $32.09/ton vs. $14.62/ton) (BXG, 
Inc. 1985b; Hill and Associates, Inc. 2003) and 
real mine-mouth prices declined by about 26% 
from $37.36/ton to $21.43/ton over the pe­
riod 1985–2000 (U.S. Department of Energy, 
Energy Information Administration various 
years). 
PRB coals now are generally viewed as 
good, though not perfect, substitutes with each 
other and with eastern coals in the generation 
3 All real values in this article are expressed in year 2000 dollars 
and are obtained using the GDP deﬂator. 
of electric power for two reasons. First, power 
plants generally have different types of gener­
ating units engineered to burn different fuels 
and can use each unit more or less intensively 
as relative fuel prices and government regula­
tions change. Second, coals obtained from dif­
ferent PRB mines are now commonly mixed 
with each other in an increasingly diversiﬁed 
fuel portfolio and, coincident with the passage 
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 
blending of PRB coal with eastern coals began 
in the early 1990s.4 In 1999, for example, 73% 
of plants that bought PRB coal did so from 
more than one mine, and, at each plant, the 
PRB coal purchased was sourced (on average) 
from 2.75 mines. 
Partly as a result of the increased po­
tential for fuel mixing, long-term contracts 
(e.g., twenty years) diminished in importance 
throughout the 1990s.5 Today, spot market pur­
chases combined with sales under shorter-term 
contracts of four years or less represent the 
industry norm. Current PRB coal contracts 
almost uniformly contain market based re­
opener provisions in place of price escalation 
or take-or-pay requirements, and this increases 
the exposure of both mines and utilities to mar­
ket forces. 
Evidence from the last twenty years also 
suggests a limited scope for strategic behav­
ior by state governments in the PRB. Over the 
period 1980–2000, Wyoming coal production 
more than tripled from 94 million tons to 340 
million tons, while Montana coal production 
increased only slightly from 30 million tons to 
38 million tons (U.S. Department of Energy, 
Energy Information Administration 2003). At 
least three factors appear to explain the dif­
fering fortunes of the coal industry in the two 
states: (1) largely because of lower in situ ratios 
(bank cubic yards of overburden moved per 
ton of recoverable coal), coal production costs 
have remained substantially lower in Wyoming 
4 Perhaps 25% of coal-ﬁred generating units now burn a blend 
of PRB and eastern coal. Nevertheless, to blend these two types of 
coal requires a signiﬁcant capital cost and certain technical barri­
ers must be overcome. PRB coal, which is subject to spontaneous 
combustion, has roughly 70% of the BTU content per pound as 
compared with Illinois Basin coal. This means that as more PRB 
coal is added to the blend, a greater total volume of coal is needed 
to generate a ﬁxed amount of energy, more ash must be disposed 
of, and more maintenance must be performed on coal handling 
and generating equipment. A separate storage area for PRB coal 
also is needed along with additional space and equipment to mix 
it with other coals. Because of the large capital cost that would 
be incurred, completely switching a generating unit’s fuel source 
between types of coal remains uncommon. 
5 The expiration of long-term contracts and the concomitant shift 
to spot sales and short-term sales agreements represents another 
reason for the decline in PRB coal prices mentioned previously. 
than in Montana;6 (2) Wyoming coal is gen­
erally of higher quality and contains fewer 
impurities than Montana coals;7 and (3) the 
transportation infrastructure out of Wyoming 
is better developed than its counterpart out 
of Montana, a feature undoubtedly related to 
the differences noted above in the extraction 
cost and quality of deposits. For these rea­
sons, strategic behavior among state govern­
ments is suppressed and the empirical analysis 
in the article focuses on Wyoming PRB coal 
production. 
Prior evidence also suggests that railroads 
exert market power. Wolak and Kolstad (1988) 
examine market power in the Western U.S. 
coal market and conclude that railroads haul­
ing coal, and in particular railroads haul­
ing coal out of Wyoming, exercise market 
power. Among railroads serving Wyoming, 
two lines—Burlington Northern Santa Fe 
(BNSF) and Union Paciﬁc (UP)—currently 
initiate all transportation of PRB coal.8 These 
railroads generally employ trains of 100 cars or 
more to haul coal from Wyoming mines to ei­
ther individual electric power plants or termi­
nals, and the rail cars, which do not simultane­
ously carry other commodities, subsequently 
return empty to the mines. 
Model 
The model extends the framework of Green-
hut and Ohta (1972) to consider spatial mar­
ket power in a duopoly railroad sector with 
an endogenously determined service region. 
Each railroad purchases low-sulfur coal at spot 
prices from a competitive mining industry in 
the PRB and delivers it to a series of spatially 
distributed, but otherwise identical electricity 
generating units (utilities). The railroads de­
liver only a single product—PRB coal—and 
select freight schedules over distance as well 
as a terminal point that deﬁnes the geographic 
extent of the market. Attention is limited to 
cases in which economies of scope do not exist 
6 In 2000, a production-weighted average of engineering esti­
mates of mine-speciﬁc variable costs per ton was 67% higher in 
Montana than in Wyoming, a percentage cost difference approxi­
mately identical to that which prevailed in 1985 (BXG 1985a; Hill 
and Associates 2000). 
7 For example, among the so-called “super-compliance” coals 
(those with very low SO2 per million BTU), the high sodium con­
tent of Montana deposits limits their marketability. 
8 The Chicago and Northwestern Railroad, which entered the 
Wyoming coal transportation market in the early 1980s, no longer 
serves the PRB. Also, the BNSF and UP do not always complete de­
liveries to all power plants because coal is frequently transshipped 
via other lines. 
in the transportation cost function. The reason 
is that deliveries of PRB coal are sufﬁciently 
large that each delivery involves a separate trip 
between a PRB mine and a utility. 
The spatial dimension of the market is de­
scribed by railroad shipments between mine-
utility pairs, where a mine-utility pair is 
measured as the distance between a utility and 
its source mine for PRB coal. To focus atten­
tion on railroad behavior, the source mines for 
PRB coal are consolidated at a single point in 
space (the origin) and utility location is mea­
sured continuously in terms of distance from 
the origin along a rail line of unit length.9 The 
maximum distance shipped by the railroads, 
N∗ ∈ (0, 1), deﬁnes the service region for low-
sulfur coal, and the remaining utilities, those 
located on the segment 1-N∗, burn high-sulfur 
coal. 
Individual electric generating units (“boil­
ers”) are assumed to be identical across utili­
ties, so that the agglomeration of boiler units 
into power plants at various points in space is 
subsumed into the spatial distribution of util­
ities. Because the freight rate on any route is 
independent of the freight rate on any other 
route, moreover, it is not necessary to spec­
ify the distribution of utilities along the rail 
line, except when considering the total quan­
tity of coal delivered. For illustrative purposes, 
the effect of SO2 policy on aggregate PRB coal 
shipments is computed under the assumption 
of a uniform distribution of utilities, although 
the results readily generalize to the case of any 
known distribution. 
Utility Demand for PRB Coal 
The fuel portfolio available to utilities is com­
prised of low-sulfur PRB coal and high-sulfur 
coal. All sources of high-sulfur coal are as­
sumed to have identical sulfur content, and 
the sources are sufﬁciently numerous that the 
delivered price of high-sulfur coal is invari­
ant over space.10 By conﬁning attention to 
only two sources of fuel, the model focuses 
on the empirical regularity of expanding PRB 
coal markets into high-sulfur coal regions in 
the Midwest, while suppressing the possibil­
ity that utilities may choose to burn fuels 
9 Greenhut and Ohta (1972) consider a discrete (and exogenous) 
number of consumers evenly distributed along a line. The speciﬁ­
cation here of a continuous distribution facilitates the calculation 
of an endogenous service region. 
10 In the predominant region of interest—the Midwest—power 
plants generally have several nearby alternatives for high-sulfur 
coal. 
∫ 
other than coal, such as natural gas, or avoid 
fuel-switching altogether by installing post-
combustion abatement equipment (“scrub­
bers”).11 Switching from high-sulfur coal to 
low-sulfur coal is an attractive compliance op­
tion for many utilities, and to highlight this 
choice, low-sulfur coal is treated as a pollution-
free alternative to high-sulfur coal. 
The electricity market is assumed to be com­
petitive and the boiler units used by utilities are 
homogeneous in all respects apart from their 
location in space. Let pe denote the electric­
ity price, and let pl(x) and ph denote, respec­
tively, the delivered prices of PRB coal and 
high-sulfur coal to a utility at distance x. 
Utilities are arrayed spatially along the rail 
line and face different freight rates, and hence 
different delivered prices, for PRB coal. To see 
the implication of this for fuel-switching be­
havior, suppose p(x) rises smoothly from zero 
over distance. Rising prices over distance di­
vide utilities into three possible categories: (i) 
for plants sufﬁciently close to the PRB source 
mines, delivered prices of PRB coal are low 
enough relative to the high-sulfur coal price 
that only PRB coal is used; (ii) for plants at 
an intermediate range of distances, delivered 
prices of PRB coal are such that fuel mixing be­
tween PRB coal and high-sulfur coal occurs; 
and (iii) for sufﬁciently long distances, deliv­
ered prices of PRB coal are high enough that 
utilities buy only high-sulfur coal. 
The goal of the model is to examine the ef­
fects of changes in environmental policy, trans­
portation cost (t) and the mine price (w) on  
the quantity of low-sulfur sold coal in the mar­
ket and on the maximum distance it is shipped. 
These outcomes are largely determined by rail­
road pricing behavior on the extensive margin 
where fuel switching occurs. To clarify these ef­
fects, the remainder of this section treats high-
and low-sulfur PRB coal as perfect substitutes 
in the generation of electricity. While this is 
a strong assumption, it has the advantage of 
creating a clear separation between the inten­
sive margin and the extensive margin of rail­
road service by suppressing the intermediate 
region where fuel mixing occurs. It also fa­
cilitates the interpretation of the econometric 
estimates presented in the next section. Impli­
cations of relaxing the perfectly substitutable 
fuels assumption are noted later on. 
The problem facing a utility at distance x is 
to select the quantity of PRB coal, ql(x), and 
11 Fuel-switching has proven to be a considerably more effec­
tive method of emissions control than postcombustion abatement 
technology. See Carlson et al. (2000). 
high-sulfur coal, qh(x), to maximize proﬁts sub­
ject to environmental policy on SO2 emissions. 
Let  denote the SO2 emissions coefﬁcient for 
high-sulfur coal, so that SO2 emissions for a 
utility at distance x can be deﬁned as e(x) = 
qh(x). Each utility is given an initial endow­
ment of SO2 allowances and must purchase an 
SO2 allowance for each unit of emissions above 
this level at a price of . 
The market price of an SO2 allowance () is  
taken as given by each ﬁrm, but is determined 
endogenously by the cap on total emissions in 
the market. Total SO2 emissions are given by 
1E =  0 qh(x) dx , and the sum of all SO2 al­
lowances must meet the regulated level of E 
under the emissions cap. 
A utility with an initial endowment of e0 al­
lowances maximizes proﬁts of 
u(x) = pe f (q(x) + qh(x)) − p(x)ql(x) 
− phqh(x) + (e0 − e(x)) 
subject to nonnegativity constraints on the use 
of low-sulfur coal, ql(x) ≥ 0 and high-sulfur 
coal qh(x) ≥ 0, and the relationship between 
high-sulfur coal use and SO2 emissions, e(x) = 
qh(x). 
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for a 
maximum are 
(1) l ≡ pe f �(.) − pl(x) ≤ 0 lql(x) = 0 
(2) 
h ≡ pe f �(.) − ph −  ≤ 0, hqh(x) = 0 
where f �(.) denotes the marginal product of 
coal in electricity production. Let ps = ph + 
 denote the effective price of high-sulfur fuel 
(inclusive of the permit requirement). Notice 
that the effective price of high-sulfur coal is in­
dependent of distance; hence the choice of a 
utility to burn PRB coal or high-sulfur coal de­
pends only on the relative prices, pl(x) and ps. 
By inspection of expressions (1) and (2), the 
conditional (inverse) demand for low-sulfur 
coal is given by p(x) for p(x) ≤ ps and zero 
otherwise. 
The Rail Sector 
In the upstream market, the spot price per unit 
of coal at the mine mouth is w.12 In the trans­
portation sector, the marginal cost of hauling 
12 Note that this formulation sets aside issues of scarcity and in­
creasing “user cost.” Low-sulfur PRB coal is in abundant supply 
and, as noted in the previous section, mine-mouth prices have 





one unit of coal an additional unit of distance 
is t.13 Accordingly, the total cost of delivering 
the quantity, ql(x), to a utility at distance x, 
is txql(x), and the total cost of procuring and 
Nhauling coal is c(Q) = 0 (w + t x)ql(x) dx , 
where N is the extensive margin of service. 
Fixed costs, which are necessary to justify 
the existence of railroad market power, play 
no role in the analysis and are consequently 
omitted. 
The railroad’s problem is to select the num­
ber of utilities to serve, N∗, and a delivered 
quantity for each utility in the service region 
x ∈ [0, N∗]. The freight charge per unit of coal 
delivered to a utility at distance x is deﬁned as 
the difference between the delivered price and 
the mine price, f (x) = p(ql(x)) − w. 
Railroads hauling low-sulfur coal compete 
in a homogeneous product transportation mar­
ket subject to capacity constraints on the 
available rail cars. Because this capacity must 
be allocated across all routes, the outcome 
for PRB freight prices can range from com­
petitive to monopolistic (i.e., railroad collu­
sion), depending on the intensity of compe­
tition between the railroads along individual 
routes. Busse and Keohane (2007) describe 
this outcome as a series of bargaining prob­
lems between a monopoly railroad and utili­
ties over freight rates, an approach that is con­
ceptually equivalent to introducing distance-
speciﬁc conduct parameters to describe the de­
parture from marginal cost pricing along each 
route. Their approach is to examine whether 
the Table A designation of electric plants leads 
to systematic differences in the bargaining 
outcome, whereas the approach taken here 
is to characterize the spatial market equilib­
rium under railroad competition and railroad 
monopoly, respectively, with regard to mine-
mouth prices, transportation costs, and the in­
troduction of SO2 policy. 
Under competition with constant unit trans­
portation costs, the freight schedule, f c(x) = tx, 
rises linearly from zero at a rate of t over dis­
tance to maintain the delivered PRB coal price 
equal to marginal transportation cost, p(x) = 
w + tx. The competitive service region for PRB 
coal terminates at distance N∗ when the deliv­
ered price rises to ps = w + tN∗ . 
Under monopoly, demand is assumed to 
be downward sloping, differentiable, and to 
satisfy 
13 This assumption of constant marginal cost per ton-mile is cor­
roborated by empirical analysis later on. 
(3) p�(ql(x)) + ql(x) p��(ql(x)) < 0. 
Equation (3), which always holds for linear 
and concave demand, is related to the stan­
dard existence condition under oligopoly (see, 
e.g., Novshek 1985). Its role is to guarantee that 
marginal revenue declines faster than price as 
the delivered quantity increases, which implies 
that demand is more elastic at higher prices. 
The transversality condition derived below re­
quires demand to be inﬁnitely elastic at the ex­
tensive margin of service, and this occurs nat­
urally over distance by condition (3) as trans­
portation costs (and delivered prices) rise. 
The optimal freight schedule potentially has 
two distinct spatial regions, which are referred 
to as region I and region II. In region I, 
utilities purchase a sufﬁciently large quantity 
of PRB coal that interior monopoly prices 
obtain, p(ql(x)) < ps. In region II, utilities 
are sufﬁciently distant that the unconstrained 
monopoly price exceeds the price of high-
sulfur coal. The railroads may continue to serve 
utilities in this region, but can do so only under 
the binding constraint that p(ql(x)) = ps. This 
implicitly deﬁnes a unique quantity delivered 
to each region II utility, denoted hereafter by 
sql . 
Let n denote the number of region I utilities 
served, and m = N − n denote the number of 
region II utilities served. The total quantity of 
coal shipped by the railroads is 
n 
s(4) Ql(x) = ql(x) dx + mql 
0 
and railroad proﬁt, accordingly, is 
n 
(w, t, ps) = ( p(ql(x)) − t x  − w)ql(x) dx 
0 
N 
s+	 (ps − t x  − w)ql dx . 
n 
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for 
a maximum proﬁt are given by the Euler 
equation, 
(5) p(ql(x)) + ql(x)p�(ql(x)) − t x  − w = 0, 
for x ∈ [0, n] 
the region I boundary condition, 
(6) p(ql(n)) = ps 
and the transversality condition, 
{ ( ) 
s(7) ( ps − t N  − w)q = 0l 
where the substitution p(ql(N)) = ps has been 
made in equation (7).14 Equations (5)–(7) have 
a straightforward interpretation. Equation (5) 
is the condition for optimal spatial pricing in 
region I. This is the standard monopoly pricing 
condition that marginal revenue be set equal 
to delivered marginal cost (w + tx) for PRB 
coal deliveries to the utility at distance x. Equa­
tion (6) deﬁnes the point in distance (x = n ∗) 
where the monopoly price of delivered PRB 
coal equates with the price of the alternative 
fuel, which describes the region I boundary. 
At distance n ∗, the unconstrained monopoly 
price rises to ps and further price increases are 
not feasible; however, proﬁt is still positive for 
shipments at this distance. Equation (7) deﬁnes 
the extensive region of railroad service (the re­
gion II boundary). Deliveries continue to the 
distance N∗, where ps equates with marginal 
transportation cost and proﬁt is zero. 
Let q ∗(x, t, w), n ∗(t, w, ps), and N∗(t, w, ps)l 
denote the solutions to (5)–(7). The railroad 
freight rate schedule is 
(8) 
f ∗(x, t, w, ps) 
∗ p ql (x, t, w) − w for x ≤ n ∗(t, w, ps) = 
ps − w for x > n ∗(t, w, ps). 
The freight rate schedule (8) rises over dis­
tance in region I until the distance n ∗(t, w, ps) 
is reached, beyond which point freight rates 
remain constant over distance in region II un­
til the terminal distance where the freight rate 
equates with transit cost, ps − w = tN∗(t, w, ps). 
Thus, in region II the relative price of high-
sulfur coal (gross of permits) to the delivered 
price of PRB coal must equate to unity. 
The freight rate schedules under competi­
tion and monopoly are depicted in ﬁgure 1 
for the case of linear demand. Notice that a 
competitive railroad industry does not have a 
region II portion of the freight rate schedule, 
whereas a monopoly (and oligopoly) railroad 
does. The monopoly freight rate schedule 
is piecewise concave, exhibiting a positive 
markup at the origin (x = 0), rising at a more 
gradual rate than under competition through­
out region I (e.g., at rate t/2 when demand 
is linear), and then equating with ps − w in 
14 The Legendre condition associated with proﬁt maximization 
holds strictly by condition (3). 
region II.15 Notice that the number of utilities 
served, N∗, which is determined by the zero 
proﬁt condition (7) at the extensive margin 
of service, is independent of railroad market 
structure. Nevertheless, because freight rates 
are lower throughout the service territory un­
der competition (and identical only for the util­
ity at distance N∗), a competitive railroad in­
dustry delivers a greater total quantity of PRB 
coal. 
Let (x) = f(x)/x denote the freight rate per 
ton-mile. In a competitive railroad sector, the 
freight rate per ton mile is constant, c(x) = t. 
Under monopoly, the freight rate per ton mile 
decreases over distance, because of the abil­
ity of railroads to spatially price discriminate. 
Unit delivery cost rises at a constant rate of t 
per unit of distance, but the margin between 
delivered price and unit cost falls as demand 
becomes increasingly elastic at more distant 
utilities. Market power declines over distance 
for a monopoly railroad in both service regions. 
Testable Predictions 
Two types of predictions can be derived from 
the model: (i) comparative static effects of 
changes in mine-mouth PRB prices, w, and 
railroad transportations costs, t, on the railroad 
service region and, on freight rates, and (ii) the 
effect of changes in SO2 policy. These predic­
tions are presented in turn below and are then 
empirically tested in the following section. 
Equation (7) indicates that the extent of the 
railroad service region, N∗, does not depend on 
market structure. Therefore, cost innovations 
that reduce either w or t have an expansionary 
effect on the market area for PRB coal that is 
independent of the degree of railroad market 
power. 
Within the service territory for PRB coal, 
the freight rate under competition, f c(x) = tx, 
does not respond to changes in w, and a small 
decrease in transportation costs of dt units de­
creases the freight rate per ton by x dt  units. 
Under monopoly, a one-unit reduction in w 
reduces the delivered price to each utility in 
region I and extends the region I boundary 
(i.e., n ∗ increases in ﬁgure 1). Freight rates rise 
by less than one unit to utilities in region I, 
whereas freight rates rise by exactly one unit 
to utilities in region II. A decline in trans­
portation costs lowers freight rates to region 
15 In the case where low- and high-sulfur coal are imperfect substi­
tutes and fuel mixing occurs along the entire rail line, the monopoly 
freight schedule is smoothly concave. 
Figure 1. Freight rate per ton schedules over distance under com­
petition and oligopoly 
Figure 2. Total quantity of PRB coal delivered under monopoly 
freight pricing 
I utilities and expands the region I boundary. 
A transportation cost decrease of dt units de­
creases monopoly freight rates by less than x dt  
units in region I, but has no effect on freight 
rates in region II because demand for PRB coal 
at these plants is perfectly elastic (see ﬁgure 1). 
A tradable allowance system for SO2 emis­
sions introduces a market price to reﬂect the 
SO2 content of high-sulfur coal. The require­
ment that utilities purchase SO2 allowances 
to offset their emissions increases the effec­
tive price of high-sulfur coal from ph to ps = 
ph +  (see equation (2)). The SO2 allowance 
price () that emerges in the permit market 
is determined by the magnitude of the man­
dated reduction in SO2 emissions—the size of 
the “cap”—and by the market demand for al­
lowances. Given the spatial distribution of util­
ities burning PRB coal and high-sulfur coal, 
market demand for SO2 allowances is deﬁned 
by aggregate demand for coal at electric plants 
located at distances (1 − N∗) along the rail 
line. Policies that limit the aggregate quantity 
of SO2 emissions alter both the extensive mar­
gin of service for PRB coal and the quantity of 
high-sulfur coal burned at each utility outside 
the service region for PRB coal.16 
The effect of SO2 regulation on the spa­
tial distribution of PRB coal deliveries is de­
picted in ﬁgure 2. Figure 2 shows the delivered 
16 An alternative to fuel substitution among utilities burning high-
sulfur coal is to meet the emissions cap by changing the emissions 
coefﬁcient (), for instance by installing postcombustion abate­
ment technology. These effects are suppressed for the reasons dis­
cussed earlier. 
quantity schedule over distance for the case 
of linear utility demand for coal. Prior to en­
vironmental regulation, the delivered quantity 
schedule declines over distance at rate –t/2p� in 
region I (see equation (5)), and then remains 
constant thereafter at qs 0 in region II. Region I 
extends outward from the source mines to the 
distance n ∗ 0 and the length N
∗ 
0 − n0 ∗ deﬁnes the 
extent of region II. The total delivered quan­
tity of PRB coal is the area under the quan­
tity schedule q0(x ∗). The total quantity of high-
sulfur coal burned by electric utilities sums the 
quantity of coal demanded by utilities located 
at distances 1- N∗ 0. Because each plant out­
side the PRB service territory burns qs 0 units 
of coal, the total quantity of high-sulfur coal 
used by all plants is (1 − N∗ 0)qs 0, which is rep­
resented in the ﬁgure by the area N∗ 0ab1. Prior 
to SO2 regulation, total emissions are E∗ = 0 
(1 − N∗ 0)qs 0. 
After cap-and-trade regulation, total SO2 
emissions decrease to the regulated level, E∗ 1 = 
(1 − N∗ 1)qs 1 < E0∗. The decrease in industry 
SO2 emissions occurs through a combination 
of input price effects that reduce the use of 
high-sulfur coal by utilities, qs 1 < q
s 
0, and fuel 
substitution effects from high-sulfur coal to 
PRB coal among utilities on the extensive mar­
gin of service, N∗ 1 > N
∗ 
0. For an arbitrary emis­
sions cap of E1units, the total amount of high-
sulfur coal used in the regulated industry is rep­
resented in ﬁgure 2 by the shaded region, area 
N∗ 1cd1, for the case of SO2 regulation that lim­
its the total quantity of high-sulfur coal burned 
at electric utilities to (1 − N∗ 1)qs 1. Utilities lo­
cated at distances between N∗ 0 and N
∗ 
1 comply 
with the regulation by substituting away from 
high-sulfur coal to PRB coal and selling their 
SO2 allowances to utilities located at greater 
distances from the source mines for PRB coal. 
The outward expansion of the service region 
for PRB coal drives up the delivered price of 
PRB coal (see equation (7)), and the expansion 
of the PRB service territory continues to dis­
tance N∗ 1 where the zero proﬁt condition on the 
extensive margin of the railroad service region 
clears individual input demand for the remain­
ing 1 – N∗ 1 utilities at the quantity (q
s 
1) neces­
sary to clear the emissions market at E∗ units.17 1 
For a binding emissions cap, the equilibrium al­
lowance price solves equation (7): ∗ = (tN∗ 1 + 
w − ph)/. 
17 Formally, under an emissions cap of E∗ 1 units the extensive mar­
gin of PRB service must satisfy N1 = 1 – E∗ 1 / q1, which can be 
used together with equations (6) and (7) to recover qs 1 and N
∗ = 11 
– E∗ 1 / q
s 
1. 
The permit price that emerges in the SO2 
allowance market is independent of market 
structure in the PRB transportation sector. 
The reason is that the permit price is driven by 
fuel switching behavior at the extensive mar­
gin of railroad service (region II) and utility 
demand for PRB coal is perfectly elastic for 
these utilities. The quantity of high-sulfur coal 
purchased by each utility located in the region 
1 – N∗ 1 must clear the individual input demand 
at a level (qs 1) that exactly allocates aggregate 
SO2 emissions to meet the cap, and the effec­
tive price of high-sulfur coal, ps, must rise to 
clear the demand at this quantity.18 
Within the service territory for PRB coal, 
SO2 policy has no effect on freight rates for 
incumbent region I utilities. Under railroad 
competition, freight rates for delivery of PRB 
coal are not altered for existing subscribers 
and the service territory for PRB coal expands 
until transportation costs rise to equate the 
delivered price of PRB coal with the permit-
inclusive price of high-sulfur coal at N∗ 1. Util­
ities switching away from high-sulfur coal and 
to PRB coal as a result of SO2 regulation 
(i.e., utilities located at distances between N∗ 0 
and N∗) pay higher freight rates than incum­1
bent PRB subscribers, although the competi­
tive freight rate per ton mile (t) remains con­
stant for all utilities. Under railroad monopoly, 
freight rates remain constant for incumbent re­
gion I utilities following SO2 regulation, but 
freight rates rise for both incumbent and en­
trant utilities in region II. Utilities located at 
distances between N∗ 0 and N
∗ 
1 that enter the 
PRB service territory in response to SO2 reg­
ulation pay the same delivered price for PRB 
coal as incumbent region II utilities located at 




This section describes the data used in the em­
pirical analysis, presents econometric results, 
and uses these results to test various implica­
tions of the model. 
18 Differences in SO2 allowance prices would emerge under var­
ious railroad market structures due to indirect effects of the pol­
icy on consumer energy prices that are suppressed in the present 
model by treating energy prices as constant in equations (1) and 
(2). With downward-sloping energy demand, SO2 policy reduces 
the total amount of coal combusted by electric utilities, which in­
creases consumer energy prices and shifts the derived demand for 
coal outward at each utility, and the level effect of the shift in coal 
input demand at the quantity level qs 1 would be capitalized into 
SO2 allowance prices. 
Data 
Data on railroad costs and freight rates are 
taken from the 1988–1999 Carload Waybill 
Samples of the U.S. Department of Transporta­
tion, Surface Transportation Board (STB). 
These data are not generally available, but 
are provided when ofﬁcially requested for a 
state-oriented research project by that state’s 
government. Data consist of a sample of rail­
road shipments either originating, terminating, 
or passing through Wyoming. For each year, 
the data were ﬁltered to eliminate all non-coal 
shipments, and coal shipments of fewer than 
ﬁfty cars, where the latter ﬁlter was applied to 
eliminate intermittent coal shipments (i.e., for 
test burns). Each year, the ﬁltered data rep­
resent between 35 and 45% of total Wyoming 
coal shipments. 
The ﬁltered data on individual coal ship­
ments were aggregated to yield 1229 obser­
vations on annual coal shipments by route 
(i.e., from one of sixteen railheads to one 
of eighty-seven power plants) for the period 
1988–1999.19 The data form an unbalanced 
panel, as deliveries of PRB coal were made 
to an increasing number of power plants over 
time. For example, there are ﬁfty-ﬁve routes 
with at least one shipment in the 1988 sample 
and 150 routes with at least one shipment in 
the 1999 sample. In the entire sample, there are 
353 routes along which deliveries were made. 
The main data elements for each route in each 
year consist of total variable costs, total freight 
revenue, total tonnage of sampled shipments, 
and route length (in railroad miles). 
While the Carload Waybill Sample data con­
tain detailed measures of railroad costs and 
freight rates that are otherwise unavailable, 
they are not without limitations. Variable costs 
are not measured directly, but rather are im­
puted using national relationships for forty 
class I railroads for each year. Also, exact 
freight revenue data are conﬁdential and ap­
proximate (sometimes overstated) values are 
reported for some shipments (for further de­
tails, see Association of American Railroads 
2000). 
Available data for real variable transporta­
tion cost per ton-mile and real freight rates 
19 Aggregation of individual shipments is necessary to comply 
with STB disclosure rules. These rules require data to be aggre­
gated to the level of at least three shippers to prevent the identiﬁ­
cation of individual railroads (Code of Federal Regulations 2001). 
As indicated previously, two railroads initiated all shipments of 
Wyoming PRB coal, but because of transshipments to other lines, 
a total of sixteen railroads were involved delivering coal to power 
plants along the sample routes. 
per ton-mile indicate that both variables de­
cline over time. Over the sample period, real 
variable cost declined by 36% from an average 
of 11.47 mills per ton-mile across all routes in 
1988 to 7.34 mills per ton-mile across all routes 
in 1999 and real freight rates per ton-mile de­
clined by 36% from an average of 19.65 mills 
per ton-mile across all routes in 1988 to an aver­
age of 12.58 mills per ton-mile across all routes 
in 1999. Under difference between means tests, 
the declines in both variables are statistically 
signiﬁcant at 1%. 
Further analysis of the cost data suggests 
that marginal transportation cost per ton-mile 
is roughly constant with respect to both tons 
and distance, a result that is established by 
regressing the natural logarithm of total real 
railroad variable cost on the natural logarithm 
of ton-miles with ﬁxed effects for each of the 
353 routes and for each of the eleven years 
(n = 1,229). The estimated elasticity of total 
variable cost with respect to ton-miles is 0.986 
(s.e. = 0.003). Thus, marginal cost per ton-mile 
is approximately equal to average variable 
cost per ton-mile and both marginal cost and 
average cost are constant over tonnage and 
distance, a plausible outcome because trains 
hauling coal from the PRB do not carry other 
commodities that would require stops at mul­
tiple delivery points. 
Table 1 shows the behavior of real freight 
rates per ton-mile by computing Lerner indices 
over routes of different length. Lerner indices 
for each route in each year were obtained by 
expressing the difference between the freight 
rate per ton-mile and marginal (= average) 
cost per ton-mile as a percentage of the freight 
rate per ton-mile. Values in table 1, obtained 
by averaging within each of three distance cat­
egories, show that the Lerner indices decline 
signiﬁcantly (at 1%) with distance, suggesting 
that railroads exercise market power.20 While 
not shown in Table 1, Lerner indices also de­
clined across all routes by an average of 15% 
between 1988 and 1999. Deregulation of rail­
roads (see Ellerman and Montero 1998 and 
Ellerman et al. 2000) may have played a role 
here, but the decline in price of high sulfur coal 
also may have been an important factor (see 
below). 
In the econometric analysis, the Carload 
Waybill Sample data were supplemented 
with information taken from Form 423 of 
20 A separate analysis of real freight rates per ton-mile also 
shows that this variable declines signiﬁcantly at the 1% level over 
distance. 
( ) 
Table 1. Lerner Indices for Three Distance Intervals 
Less than 550 Between 550 More than 1,100 
Power Plant Miles from Miles and 1,100 Miles Miles from 
Location is: PRB (1) from PRB (2) PRB (3) 
Lerner Index 
Mean 0.553 0.372 0.329 
Standard error 0.007 0.005 0.006 
N 127 536 573 
Difference between means (1)–(2) (1)–(3) (2)–(3) 
t-statistic 21.04 25.38 5.51 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC). This form records the quantity of coal 
received by a power plant on each shipment 
(not just sampled shipments), the delivered 
price, the name of the mine from which the 
coal was shipped, whether the shipment rep­
resented a contract or spot sale, and selected 
characteristics of the coal shipped including 
BTU, sulfur, and ash content. These data were 
aggregated and then matched by route and 
year to 1229 observations obtained from the 
Carload Waybill Sample. 
Econometric Analysis 
Implications of the theoretical model are 
tested by estimating a three equation simul­
taneous equation model to explain marginal 
transportation cost per ton-mile, freight rates 
per ton-mile, and quantity of coal shipped 
along each route in each year. Transportation 
costs and freight rates are measured in real 
terms. Estimation is by 3 SLS with a full set 
of ﬁxed effects for routes and years. Whereas 
the model assumed that routes differ only in 
length, econometric estimates control for het­
erogeneity among mines and power plants as 
well as over time. Control for route-speciﬁc 
effects is achieved by expressing all variables 
in all equations as differences from their time 
means. Time-speciﬁc effects are accounted for 
by including dummy variables for the years 
1989–1999 in each equation. 
The three equations are further speciﬁed as 
follows. First, the equation for marginal trans­
portation cost per ton-mile (t) is linear with 
covariates measuring two institutional factors 
(railcar ownership and number of interline 
transfers) discussed more fully below as results 
of estimation are described. Because marginal 
cost per ton-mile was found to be approxi­
mately constant over distance, the freight rate 
was not entered as an explanatory variable in 
this equation.21 Quantity of coal shipped was 
not entered as a covariate either because PRB 
coal usually is transported in units of about 100 
rail cars and the number of trips from the mines 
to a plant should not affect marginal trans­
port cost on any given trip. Route-speciﬁc ef­
fects were included because marginal cost per 
ton-mile, while approximately constant over 
distance for each route, differs across routes. 
Time-speciﬁc effects control for factors such as 
railroad productivity improvements, changes 
in fuel costs, and the gradual switch from steel 
railcars to lighter-weight aluminum railcars. 
Second, the freight rate equation is based on 
the assumption of linear power plant demand 
for PRB coal and makes use of equation (8). 
This equation indicates that if railroads exer­
cise monopoly power, the optimal freight rate 
per ton (f ∗) is positive at the origin, increases 
with distance (x) at rate t/2 in region I and then, 
beginning at (x = n ∗) is equal to difference be­
tween the substitute fuel price and the mine-
mouth PRB coal price (w) throughout region 
II (see ﬁgure 1). On the other hand, if railroads 
behave competitively, the freight rate per ton 
is zero at the origin and then increases with 
distance at the rate of t throughout the entire 
service territory. Thus, equation (8) suggests 
estimating a spline function (see Greene 2003, 
pp. 121–122): 
f ∗(9) jT = 0 jT + 1t jT x j 
∗ + 2d jTt jT x j − n jT + u jT. 
In equation (9), j indexes routes, T indexes 
∗ ∗ years, djt = 1 if  xj ≥ njt, djt = 0 if  xj < njt, 
and u is an error term with zero mean and 
21 In an alternative speciﬁcation of the model, the freight rate 
was tried as a covariate in the marginal cost equation, however, 
its coefﬁcient did not differ signiﬁcantly from zero at conventional 
levels. 
a conveniently speciﬁed variance that is as­
sumed to be proportional to the square of 
distance along a given route. Heterogeneity 
across routes is expected because of: (1) dif­
ferences in mine-mouth PRB coal price (due 
to differences in heat and impurity content) of 
coals loaded at PRB railheads and (2) differ­
ences in the price of high-sulfur coal and other 
fuels to electric power plants. Heterogeneity 
over time arises because of trends in coal prices 
affecting all Wyoming PRB mines (e.g., due to 
factors identiﬁed previously that led to declin­
ing mining costs), changes in environmental 
policy affecting coal users, prices of SO2 emis­
sion permits, and trends in prices of fuels such 
as high-sulfur coal, oil and natural gas that im­
pact fuel choices by electric power plants. In 
consequence, equation (9) uses ﬁxed effects to 
allow for differences in the intercept as well as 
in the boundary between region I and region II 
over both routes and time.22 The ﬁxed effects 
allow for correlation between the purely route-
and time-varying innovations and the included 
covariates (x), but not with the error term (u). 
The slope coefﬁcient estimates from equation 
(9) are interpreted as conditional on the ﬁxed 
effects (see Greene 2003 for details). Restric­
tions on equation (9) implied by the model are 
that: (1) under competition, 0jT = 2 = 0, and 
1 = 1 for all routes and years and (2) under 
railroad monopoly power, when PRB coal and 
high-sulfur coal are perfect substitutes, 1 = 
1/2 = −2 and 0jT > 0 for all routes and years. 
Because data on PRB mine-mouth coal 
prices (wjt) by mine and over time are unavail­
able, a useful approach to estimation is to sub­
∗stitute for njt and then rewrite equation (9) (see 
footnote #22) as 
(10) f j∗ T = 0 jT + 1t jT x j + 2d jTt jTx j + u jT 
where if 1 = 1/2 = −2, then  0jT = [wjT + 
(a/b)jT]/2 if  djT = 0 and  0jT = psjT if djT = 
1. The equation to be estimated then is ob­
tained by dividing through by xj to express the 
dependent variable as the freight rate per ton-
mile, to remove heteroskedasticity in ujT, and 
to include the effect of distance (a pure route-
speciﬁc effect) in the intercepts. ojT is ap­
proximated by a set of route- and time-speciﬁc 
22 If, except for length, routes are homogeneous, then linear 
power plant demand for PRB coal (q = a − bp) together with 
monopoly power by proﬁt-maximizing railroads implies that n ∗ = 
[2ps − w − (a/b)]/t. Allowing for heterogeneity over routes and 
time in alternative fuel prices, in PRB mine-mouth coal prices, 
and in power plant demand parameter suggest that the boundary 
between region I and region II will vary over routes and time as 
well. 
constants. Three covariates were added to 
complete the speciﬁcation: (1) a dummy vari­
able to indicate whether the coal was trans­
ported to a power plant with Table A units, (2) 
the total annual quantity of coal purchased by 
the power plant (in tons per mile), and (3) a 
dummy variable to indicate whether the coal 
shipped was a spot sale. 
A difﬁcult aspect of estimating equation 
(10), however, is to specify djt so that it ap­
propriately classiﬁes routes either as region 
I routes or as region II routes. As indicated 
above, it is problematic to obtain reliable es­
timates of n ∗ jt and it is not fruitful to attempt 
to classify region I and region II routes in each 
year on a priori grounds. Instead, the approach 
taken is to assume that values of n ∗ jt do not dif­
fer widely either across routes or over time, so 
that one value of n ∗ can classify routes accord­
ing to whether they serve region I or region II 
utilities.23 If this assumption is workable and 
the model correctly describes behavior, then it 
should be possible to ﬁnd a value of n ∗ such 
that the estimate of 1 ≈ −2 ≈ 1/2. 
Third, in the demand equation for PRB coal 
by destination power plants, the quantity of 
coal was expressed as a linear function of the 
freight rate per ton-mile, the generation ca­
pacity of the destination plant, and a dummy 
variable for whether the destination plant had 
Table A units. Quantity of coal purchased is 
measured in tons per mile to maintain con­
sistency with the freight rate equation. Be­
cause the freight rate is measured in ton-miles, 
this speciﬁcation imposes an “identical power 
plant” restriction in that changes in freight 
rates per ton have the same effect on tons 
of PRB coal demanded for all power plants 
regardless of their distance from the mines. 
Route-effects were included to account for dif­
ferences in characteristics of power plants and 
in route length. Time-effects were included to 
account for changes in the prices of substitute 
fuels and changes in environmental policy that 
occurred through passage of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990. 
Table 2 presents sample means of all covari­
ates (see column (1)) and coefﬁcient estimates 
in the equations for marginal transportation 
cost per ton-mile (see column (2)), the freight 
23 An unsuccessful attempt was made to check this speciﬁcation 
after the fact that by using available data on average prices over 
time for high-sulfur coal and PRB coal together with estimates 
from the PRB coal demand equation (see footnote #22). Calcula­
tions of the boundary between region I and region II turned out to 
be quite sensitive to the estimates of the route-speciﬁc intercepts 
in the PRB coal demand equation. 
Table 2. Determinants of Marginal Cost, Freight Rates, and Coal Demand (NT = 1,229) 
Sample Real Marginal Real Freight Tons per Mile 
Explanatory Mean Cost Rate of PRB Coal 
Variable (Std. Dev.) Per Ton-Mile Per Ton-Mile Purchased 
=1 if year is 1988; 0.044 –b 
0 otherwise (0.205) ––b ––b 
=1 if year is 1989; 0.050 −0.111 −0.288 6.21 
0 otherwise (0.219) (0.231) (0.396) (262.10) 
=1 if year is 1990; 0.060 0.115 −0.671 −96.97 
0 otherwise (0.238) (0.229) (0.387) (262.91) 
=1 if year is 1991; 0.054 −0.753∗ −1.493∗ −98.29 
0 otherwise (0.226) (0.229) (0.396) (282.43) 
=1 if year is 1992; 0.063 −1.456∗ −2.024∗ −654.96∗ 
0 otherwise (0.242) (0.226) (0.387) (297.77) 
=1 if year is 1993; 0.057 −1.327∗ −2.000∗ −613.62∗ 
0 otherwise (0.231) (0.234) (0.404) (308.96) 
=1 if year is 1994; 0.099 −2.324∗ −2.289∗ −1052.32∗ 
0 otherwise (0.299) (0.213) (0.376) (308.92) 
=1 if year is 1995; 0.104 −2.543∗ −2.144∗ −1172.94∗ 
0 otherwise (0.306) (0.214) (0.381) (314.22) 
=1 if year is 1996; 0.097 −2.200∗ −2.453∗ −1864.54∗ 
0 otherwise (0.296) (0.224) (0.388) (381.65) 
=1 if year is 1997; 0.116 −2.230∗ −2.301∗ −2264.06∗ 
0 otherwise (0.321) (0.226) (0.385) (423.09) 
=1 if year is 1998; 0.133 −2.560∗ −2.824∗ −2553.34∗ 
0 otherwise (0.339) (0.226) (0.395) (471.26) 
=1 if year is 1999; 0.122 −3.110∗ −3.722∗ −3209.98∗ 
0 otherwise (0.328) (0.232) (0.419) (562.48) 
Real Marginal Cost per ton-mile 1.060 0.801∗ 
(3.207) ––b (0.141) ––b 
Real Marginal Cost × dummy variable 3.897 ––b −0.750 ––b 
that equals one if distance to utility is (4.697) (0.158) 
greater than 550 miles from mine; 
zero otherwise 
Fraction of spot sales	 0.350 ––b 0.568∗ 
(0.454) (0.248) ––b 
=1 if destination utility has Table A 0.218 ––b −1.013 −492.20 
generating units; 0 otherwise (0.413) (0.889) (594.92) 
Number of Interline Transfers 0.660 0.343∗ ––b 
(0.856) (0.086) ––b 
Fraction of railcars not owned by a 0.762 −2.156∗ ––b 
railroad (0.340) (0.206) ––b 
Real freight rate 14.718 ––b −345.59∗ 
(5.451) ––b (67.51)
 
Destination utility generation in 4.248 ––b ––b 3890.67∗
 
billions of KWH (0.248) (594.92)
 
Tons per mile of PRB coal	 1342.10 ––b −0.0002 
purchased (2088.09) (0.0003) ––b 
Note: All monetary variables are in mills of year 2000 dollars, standard errors are in parenthesis below coefﬁcient estimates, the letter b denotes variables not 
included in a regression, and an asterisk (∗) denotes a coefﬁcient that is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. 
rate per ton-mile (see column (3)), and tons the same amount each year.24 Controls for rail-
of coal shipped per mile (see column (4)). car ownership and the number of junctions 
In the estimated equation for marginal trans- between rail lines are signiﬁcant determinants 
portation costs per ton-mile, coefﬁcients of 
time dummies reﬂect generally decreasing 
24 For instance, these coefﬁcients show an abrupt decline in 1994. marginal cost per ton-mile over the period This may be partly because the panel is unbalanced and the number 
1988–1999, although costs do not decline by of routes in the sample increased by about 75% in that year. 
of marginal cost. Rail car ownership measures 
the percentage of railcars in the sampled coal 
shipments that were not owned by the rail­
road hauling coal.25 Use of these cars would 
lower railroad costs, and, as shown in table 2, 
this variable has a negative coefﬁcient (−2.16) 
that is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 
1% level. Marginal cost per ton-mile increases 
with the number of junctions (interline trans­
fers between railroads) along a route and the 
coefﬁcient of this variable is positive (0.34) 
and signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1% 
level. This outcome is consistent with results 
presented by Tye (1990). 
Five main results emerge from the estimates 
of the real freight rate per ton-mile equa­
tion. First, this equation allows for changes 
in marginal transportation cost to affect the 
freight rate differently depending on the extent 
of market power in the railroad sector. Recall 
that under competition, a one-unit change in 
marginal transportation cost leads to an iden­
tical one-unit change in the freight rate at all 
points along the rail line. In contrast, under 
railroad market power a one-unit change in 
marginal transportation cost leads to a less 
than one-unit change in the freight rate for 
the plants in region I and a one-unit change 
in marginal transportation costs has no effect 
on freight rates to plants in region II. Esti­
mates in column (3) show that the coefﬁcient 
of marginal transportation costs is signiﬁcantly 
greater than zero (at 1%) and that the in­
teraction of marginal transportation cost and 
the dummy variable indicating route distance 
greater than 550 miles is negative and signif­
icant (at 1%). The null hypothesis that these 
two coefﬁcients add to zero is not rejected 
at the 1% level, supporting: (1) the notion 
that railroads have market power, (2) the di­
vision point between region I and region II is 
at approximately 550 miles with about 90% of 
plants in region II, and (3) marginal transport 
costs affect the freight rate within 550 miles 
of the mines, but have no effect beyond that 
point.26 
Second, the equation permits a test of 
whether freight rates differ between plants 
with and without Table A generating units. The 
25 These cars might be owned by another railroad or by a utility. 
26 This result rests on a division of routes into two bins, routes less 
than 550 miles (the shortest 10% of routes) and routes longer than 
550 miles (the longest 90% of routes). In alternative speciﬁcations, 
the mileage breakpoint deﬁning the bins was increased with the 
result that the estimate of 1(see equation (10)) declines, as would 
be expected if region II plants are incorrectly classiﬁed as region I 
plants. Dividing routes longer than 550 miles into more bins also 
was tried and the results were little changed. 
model predicts that freight rates will not dif­
fer between such plants under both railroad 
competition and monopoly. Under competi­
tion, the freight rate always is equated with 
marginal transportation cost, so that the des­
ignation of Table A generating units makes 
no difference for railroad freight rates. Under 
monopoly, an increase in the cost of burning 
high-sulfur coal leads to no change in freight 
rates in region I. All region I plants burn low-
sulfur coal and the railroad’s proﬁt maximizing 
freight rate is simply a mark-up over marginal 
transportation cost that does not depend on 
the high-sulfur coal price. In region II, an in­
crease in the cost of burning high-sulfur coal 
increases freight rates to all buyers, both new 
and incumbent, whether or not they operate 
Table A units. Thus, plants with Table A units 
do not see an increase in freight rates beyond 
the rate charged to plants with no Table A 
units. This prediction that freight rates to plants 
with Table A units are the same as those to 
plants without Table A units is borne out in the 
estimates: The coefﬁcient of the dummy vari­
able for plants with Table A generating units 
is not signiﬁcantly different from zero at con­
ventional levels. 
Using a bargaining model, Busse and Keo­
hane (2007) predict that after the initiation 
of SO2 emissions trading: (1) delivered prices 
of PRB coal will be higher at plants with 
Table A units relative to plants with no Ta­
ble A units and (2) delivered prices of PRB 
coal increased by more at plants with Table 
A units that are closer to mines than at sim­
ilar plants located at a greater distance from 
the mines. Because their econometric analysis 
supports these predictions, these possibilities 
were tested in expanded speciﬁcations of the 
freight rate equation. When the speciﬁcation 
of the freight rate equation is altered from that 
shown in Table 2 by including interactions of 
the Table A dummy variable with the dum­
mies for years 1994–1999 (and other equations 
speciﬁed as shown in table 2), the estimated co­
efﬁcient of the interaction with year 1999 was 
positive and differed signiﬁcantly from zero at 
the 1% level. Coefﬁcients of other interactions 
did not differ signiﬁcantly from zero at conven­
tional levels, so in this expanded speciﬁcation, 
plants with Table A units did not see higher 
freight rates beyond those charged to other 
plants except in 1999. Also, starting from the 
Table 2 speciﬁcation, when Table A dummy 
in the freight rate equation was replaced with 
interactions between it and two dummy vari­
ables for whether a plant was less than 1,100 
miles from the PRB mines and whether a plant 
was more than 1,100 miles away, coefﬁcients of 
the two interaction variables did not differ sig­
niﬁcantly from zero. 
Possible explanations for why these results 
differ from those presented by Busse and Keo­
hane (2007) are that the analysis in this arti­
cle: (1) uses the STB data of railroad freight 
rates rather than FERC 423 data on deliv­
ered PRB coal prices and (2) controls un­
observed heterogeneity between cross-section 
units using route-effects, rather than by sep­
arately entering mine-effects (origin-effects) 
and plant-effects (destination-effects). For in­
stance, in the present analysis, inclusion of 353 
route-effects better controls for cross-section 
heterogeneity than would the inclusion six­
teen railhead-effects and eighty-seven power-
plant effects because the route effects allow 
the railhead- and power-plant effects to be 
matched, thus completely removing the effect 
of distance. 
Third, spot sales tend to occur at lower 
mine-mouth prices than coal sold under either 
short- or long-term contracts. Under competi­
tion, the freight rate is unaffected by a lower 
mine-mouth price of PRB coal; whereas under 
monopoly, a one-unit reduction in the mine-
mouth price of PRB coal leads to a less than 
one-unit increase in freight rates in region I and 
exactly a one-unit reduction in freight rates in 
region II. In column (3), the coefﬁcient of spot 
market sales is positive and signiﬁcantly differ­
ent from zero at the 1% level. This outcome 
again supports the notion of market power in 
the railroad sector as lower mine-mouth PRB 
coal prices secured through spot sales result 
in higher freight rates. Fourth, time dummies 
are included to capture a number of unob­
served factors (including those previously enu­
merated such as SO2 permit prices) that vary 
over time, but not across electric generating 
plants. Coefﬁcient estimates of the time dum­
mies indicate that on balance these factors led 
to a signiﬁcant (at 1%) decline in freight rates 
over the period 1988–1999. Implications of this 
result are further developed in the next subsec­
tion. Fifth, the quantity of coal purchased by 
an electric generating plant is unimportant in 
determining freight rates. 
The third equation in the system estimates 
the responsiveness of the quantity of PRB 
coal demanded by power plants to changes in 
freight rates. Because the quantity of coal pur­
chased does not affect the freight rate, changes 
in the observed freight rate (per ton mile) can 
be used to trace out the demand curve. The de­
pendent variable in this equation is expressed 
as total annual tons of coal purchased per mile 
of distance from the PRB mines. 
Results presented in table 2, column (4) in­
dicates that the previously described declines 
in freight rates have a positive and signiﬁcant 
(at 1%) effect on quantity of PRB coal pur­
chased. The elasticity of quantity demanded 
with respect to a change in the freight rate, 
evaluated at sample means of these variables, 
is −3.79. This estimate indicates that: (1) PRB 
coal is a close substitute for other fuels used to 
generate electric power (e.g., high-sulfur coal, 
natural gas, and oil) whose prices are con­
trolled with time dummies and (2) railroads 
operate on the elastic portion of the demand 
schedule for PRB coal, an outcome consistent 
with railroad market power. Additionally, in­
creases in electric generation capacity have a 
positive and signiﬁcant (at 1%) effect on the 
quantity of coal demanded. Coefﬁcients of the 
time dummies reﬂect a downward trend in 
the total quantity of PRB coal purchased 
per mile of distance, possibly because aver­
age route length increased over the sample 
period and delivered quantity declines over 
distance. The coefﬁcient of the dummy vari­
able for electric generating plants with Table 
A units, however is not signiﬁcant at conven­
tional levels. This outcome is consistent with 
the notion discussed previously that all plants 
in region II face the same delivered price of 
PRB coal whether or not they operate Table A 
units.27 
Discussion 
Estimates from the econometric model and in­
formation provided in the background section 
can be used in conjunction with the model to 
make some rough calculations that explain the 
dramatic increase in utilization of PRB coal 
in electric power generation in terms of: (1) 
a market area effect and (2) a fuel substitu­
tion effect. The market area effect refers to 
the small geographic expansion of the rail­
roads’ service territory for transporting PRB 
27 The robustness of this result was checked in three ways. First, 
the three equation system was reestimated with quantity of coal 
speciﬁed in tons, rather than tons per mile. The coefﬁcient of the 
Table A dummy did not differ signiﬁcantly from zero at 5%. Sec­
ond, the system was reestimated after excluding from the sample 
157 observations that involved electric generating plants that opted 
in to phase I regulations. The opt-in plants were identiﬁed from a 
complete list of such plants furnished by J.-P. Montero. Again, the 
coefﬁcient of the Table A dummy did not differ signiﬁcantly from 
zero at 5%. Third, interactions of the Table A dummy variable 
with the time dummies also were tried as explanatory variables, 
however, coefﬁcients of these interaction variables never were sig­
niﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level or lower. 
coal that occurred between the years 1988 and 
1999. Over the period 1988–1997, the average 
distance over which PRB coal was transported 
increased from about 993 miles to 1,037 miles 
(U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Informa­
tion Administration 2000, p. 15) and over the 
period 1988–1999, the length of the longest 
route in the Carload Waybill sample grew from 
1,575 miles to 1,673 miles. Four factors led 
to this expansion. First, real railroad marginal 
transportation costs declined 36% from an av­
erage of 11.47 mills per ton-mile in 1988 to an 
average of 7.34 mills per ton-mile in 1999. Sec­
ond, the real mine-mouth price of PRB coal 
declined 50% from $0.64 per million BTUs 
in 1988 to $0.32 per million BTUs in 1999 
(Hill and Associates 2000). Third, more strin­
gent environmental regulation brought about 
by the introduction of SO2 emission permits 
raised the overall cost of burning high-sulfur 
coal by about $0.15.28 Fourth and set against 
the ﬁrst three factors, high sulfur coal prices 
declined between the years 1988 and 1999. 
Among utilities purchasing PRB coal identi­
ﬁed in the Carload Waybill Sample, FERC 423 
records indicate that the average real deliv­
ered price of non-Wyoming coal, an estimate 
of the high-sulfur coal price net of SO2 emis­
sion permit costs, declined from $1.91 per mil­
lion BTUs in 1988 to $1.27 per million BTUs 
in 1999. Inclusive of SO2 permit costs, the esti­
mated 1999 price of one million BTUs of non-
Wyoming coal was $1.42. 
To more clearly illustrate how these fac­
tors coalesce, consider the example of haul­
ing one million BTUs of 8800 BTU/lb. PRB 
coal hauled a distance of 1,600 miles in 1988. 
As indicated previously, a route of this length 
represents about the maximum distance that 
PRB coal was transported during the late 
1980s. Adding the railroad transportation cost 
of making this delivery ($1.04 = $0.01742 × 
(1,000,000/8800) × 1600) to the mine-mouth 
price of PRB coal ($0.64), yields $1.68, which 
is lower than the price ($1.91) of non-Wyoming 
coal prevailing at that time. Thus, railroads 
appear to have had an incentive to haul coal 
greater distances than 1,600 miles prior to the 
enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990. This incentive increased throughout 
the 1990s, and by 1999, the delivered cost of 
28 This calculation assumes that: (1) nonWyoming coal averages 
12,000 BTU/lb., (2) nonWyoming coal has 1.5 more pounds of SO2 
per million BTUs than allowed under phase I compliance rules 
(2.5 pounds of SO2 per million BTUs), and (3) the market price of 
a permit to emit one ton of SO2 averaged $195 in 1999. 
one million BTUs of PRB coal to a utility 1,600 
miles distant had fallen by $0.64 in real terms to 
$1.04 (the mine-mouth price of $0.32 plus rail­
road transportation cost of $0.72). The deliv­
ered price of high-sulfur coal (inclusive of SO2 
emission permit costs) also fell over this pe­
riod, but by a lesser amount ($0.49; from $1.91 
to $1.42), and the price per million BTUs at 
this distance fell by more for delivered PRB 
coal than for high-sulfur coal even when no 
accounting is made for the shadow cost of SO2 
emission permits. In summary, it appears that 
incentives already in place in the late 1980s, to­
gether with price declines in the mine-mouth 
price of PRB coal and declines in railroad 
transportation cost, can explain much of the 
small geographic expansion in the railroad ser­
vice territory for PRB coal. 
What other factors explain the rapid expan­
sion of PRB coal utilization? The coefﬁcient 
estimates of the time dummies in the table 2, 
column (3) regression imply that, for a repre­
sentative shipment of 8800 BTU/lb. PRB coal 
to a utility 1,600 miles distant, the real freight 
rate fell by approximately $0.34 per million 
BTUs over the period 1988–1999, reducing the 
delivered price per million BTUs of PRB coal 
in real terms by $0.66 ($0.34 + $0.32). This 
35% decline in price not only exceeded the 
26% decline in the (permit-inclusive) real price 
of high-sulfur coal; it also exceeded the real 
price declines that occurred in both natural gas 
(12%) and crude oil (15%) over the period. 
Given the estimated price elasticity of demand 
for PRB coal of –3.79, this change in relative 
prices suggests that power plant operators sub­
stituted heavily in the favor of PRB coal and 
away from the use of other alternative fuels 
for the generation of electric power through­
out the market area. This substitution could 
have occurred, for example, through utiliza­
tion of coal mixtures tilted toward heavier use 
of PRB coal and using PRB coal-ﬁred gener­
ating units more intensively. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This article examines possible explanations 
for the dramatically increased utilization of 
PRB low-sulfur coal to generate electric power 
that occurred during the late 1980s and 1990s. 
Effects of environmental policy, costs, and 
relative prices are examined using a three-
sector model of coal production, transporta­
tion, and consumption that emphasizes the 
role of railroads in hauling coal to spatially 
distributed utilities. The relative importance of 
each of the various explanations depends criti­
cally on whether (and to what extent) railroads 
exercise market power in setting freight rates 
on low-sulfur coal. 
Key ﬁndings from this study suggest that: 
(1) railroads held market power over deliv­
ered low-sulfur coal prices, (2) the geographic 
market for PRB coal expanded mainly be­
cause of substantial declines in both the real 
mine-mouth price of PRB coal and the real 
marginal cost of rail transportation, (3) the de­
cline in both the mine-mouth price of PRB coal 
together with the decline in railroad freight 
rates induced power plant operators to sub­
stitute PRB coal for high-sulfur coal as well as 
for other fuels because demand for PRB coal 
is price elastic. More stringent environmental 
policy on SO2 emissions also appears to have 
led to increased utilization of PRB coal, how­
ever, the effect of policy is moderated by the 
existence of railroad market power. These re­
sults are broadly consistent with the view that 
much of the increased utilization of PRB low-
sulfur coal was due to the operation of market 
forces rather than to changes in environmental 
policy. 
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